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CRIMINAL LAW-PRESUMPrIONS--ABROGATION OF TRIAL BY 
JURY-COunty Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979). 
I. FACTS 
On March 28, 1973, an automobile was stopped for speeding 
on the New York State Thruway. The vehicle was occupied by 
Melvin Lemmon, the driver, Jane Doe, a sixteen-year-old girl 
seated beside him, and Samuel Allen and Raymond Hardrick, pas­
sengers in the back seat. While the car was stopped, one of the of­
ficers observed a gun protruding from Ms. Doe's handbag, which 
was positioned on the floor of the car near the passenger side door. 
Upon inspection, the handbag was found to contain two guns, a .45 
automatic and a .38 revolver.1 
The four occupants were tried and convicted of illegal posses­
sion of the two handguns. 2 The convictions were upheld on appeal 
by the New York Supreme Court Appellate Division3 and the New 
York Court of Appeals. 4 The three male defendants filed a petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of New York. The writ was granted and 
upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir­
cuit. 5 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 6 
At issue in this case is the constitutionality of the presumption 
contained in the statute under which the four were convicted, sec­
tion 265.15(3) of the New York Penal Law. 7 This statute makes 
1. County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 143 (1979). 
2. They were acquitted of possession of a machine gun and a pound of heroin 
found in the trunk of the car, presumably because none of them owned the car nor 
had a key to the trunk. [d. at 144. 
3. People v. Lemmon, 49 App. Div. 2d 639, 370 N.Y.S.2d 243 (1975). 
4. People v. Lemmon, 40 N.Y.2d 505, 354 N.E.2d 836, 387 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1976). 
5. Allen v. County Court, Ulster County, 568 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1977). 
6. County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 439 U.S. 815 (1978). 
7. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.15(3) (McKinney 1967): 

The presence in an automobile, other than a stolen one or a public omnibus, 

of any firearm, defaced firearm, firearm silencer, bomb, bombshell, gravity­

knife, switchblade knife, dagger, dirk, stiletto, billy, blackjack, metal knuc­

kles, sandbag, sandclub or slingshot is presumptive evidence of its posses­
67 
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presence in an automobile found to contain an illegal weapon pre­
sumptive evidence of possession by all occupants of the automo­
bile. As interpreted by the New York Court of Appeals, the pre­
sumption created by the statute is permissive. 8 Under this 
interpretation, the jury is allowed, but not required, to find the 
presumed fact of possession from proof of the basic facts of pres­
ence of the guns and persons. 9 The importance of the presumption 
is that this possibility of possession by all of the car's occupants is 
commanded to the jury's attention via the judge's instructions. At 
trial, the prosecution relied upon the presumption to prove its 
case. 10 In their application for habeas corpus, the defendants con­
tended that the presumption constituted a denial of due process 
because of its failure to conform to the standards previously 
adopted by the United States Supreme Court.ll 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Functions of Presumptions 
Presumptions developed from the common-law practice of 
judges' commenting on and interpreting the evidence while in­
structing the jury.12 As similar factual situations presented them­
sion by all persons occupying such automobile at the time such weapon, in­
strument or appliance is found, except under the following circumstances: 
(a) if such weapon, instrument or appliance is found upon the person of 
one of the occupants therein; 
(b) if such weapon, instrument or appliance is found in an automobile 
which is being operated for hire by a duly licensed driver in the due, lawful 
and proper pursuit of his trade, then such presumption shall not apply to the 
driver; or 
(c) if the weapon so found is a pistol or revolver and one of the occu­
pants, not present under duress, has in his possession a valid license to have 
and carry concealed the same. 
8. People v. Lemmon, 40 N.Y.2d 505, 510, 354 N.E.2d 836, 840, 387 N.Y.S.2d 
97, 100 (1976). 
9. The judge's instruction to the jury reflected this interpretation: "Our Penal 
Law also provides that the presence in an automobile ... of any handgun ... is pre­
sumptive evidence of their unlawful possession. 
In other words ... you may infer and draw the conclusion that such prohibitive 
weapon was possessed by each of the defendants who occupied the automobile 
...." 442 U.S. at 161 (quoting trial transcript at 743) (emphasis added). Were the 
presumption mandatory, the jurors would have been told that they must draw the 
conclusion unless it was rebutted by evidence to the contrary. 
10. Allen v. County Court, Ulster County, 568 F.2d 998, 1000 (2d Cir. 1977). 
11. County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 146 (1979). For a 
discussion of the standards, see text accompanying notes 30-45 infra. 
12. McCormick, What Shall the Trial Judge Tell the Jury About Presumptions?, 
13 WASH. L. REV. 185, 186 (1938). 
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selves and the instructions were repeated, these judicial sentiments 
were hardened into rules of law. Presumptions were eventually 
created by statute as well. 13 Although originally developed to ac­
cord with likelihood and probability, presumptions came to be 
used for other purposes. Presumptions have been invoked to serve 
six major functions. 14 
First, they may exclude issues which might not be litigated. A 
presumption of this nature merely affects the burden to plead an 
issue. An example would be what is often called the "presumption 
of sanity." All this may mean is that if a defendant intends to make 
insanity an issue in the case, he must raise it. The burden of proof 
remains on the prosecution. There is no effect on the jury's delib­
erations. Indeed, the jury is not even instructed as to the existence 
of any presumption. The entire effect is procedural. This type of 
presumption raises none of the difficulties to be discussed in this 
note. 
Second, a presumption may avoid a procedural impasse where 
evidence as to the presumed fact is lacking. For example, in a few 
jurisdictions, when a person has been unexplainedly absent for 
seven years, death is presumed to take place at the first instant of 
the eighth year of absence. 15 
Third, a presumption may avoid an impasse due to the impos­
sibility of securing competent evidence. Illustrative are statutes fix­
ing the order of death in common disasters for the purpose of 
determining rights to inheritance and to insurance benefits. IS 
Fourth, a presumption may serve to produce a result in accord 
with the preponderance of probability. This is the original function 
of presumptions, dating back to judges' commenting on the evi­
dence while instructing the jury. 
Fifth, one may place the burden of producing evidence upon 
the party with the greater access to it. This is one reason for the 
tort doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. A defendant is presumptively 
negligent when the instrumentality of the injury was in his exclu­
sive control. 17 
13. An early presumption of theft from possession of stolen property is found in 
the laws of Ine, the King of Wessex, (688-725 A.D.). J. THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREA­
TISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE AT COMMON LAW 327 (1898). 
14. Morgan, How to Approach Burden of Proof and Presumptions, 25 ROCKY 
MTN. L. REV. 34 (1953). 
15. Montgomery v. Bevans, 17 F. Cas. 628 (C.C.D. Cal. 1871) (No. 9,735). See 
Annot., 75 A.L.R. 630 (1931). 
16. Morgan, supra note 14, at 44 (citing Uniform Simultaneous Death Act). 
17. See Hake v. George Wiedemann Brewing Co., 23 Ohio St. 2d 65, 262 
N.E.2d 703 (1970); Byrne v. Boadle, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (1863). 
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Sixth, a presumption may be used to achieve a socially desir­
able result. A child born to a married woman is presumed to be the 
child of her husband. This presumption serves the societal goal of 
encouraging parents to support their children. 
Some of these functions, while justifiable in a civil context, are 
inconsistent with the basic purposes of the criminal law. Presump­
tions creating a substitute for evidence where evidence is un­
attainable or nonexistent are justifiable in civil cases. The purpose 
of civil law is to settle controversies between private parties. The 
value of presumptions is in providing an end to the controversy in 
a consistent and predictable fashion. The harm of an incorrect re­
sult is outweighed by the social good achieved by ending the 
dispute. 
In criminal law, however, such an artificial substitute for evi­
dence would increase the possibility of mistakenly convicting an in­
nocent person while it would lessen the possibility of acquitting the 
guilty because guilt would be found without evidence. On the con­
trary, our society has long felt it a greater evil to find guilty and to 
punish an innocent person than to allow a guilty person to es­
cape. 1S The principle which is the very essence of criminal law 
is that evidence must be presented to prove the guilt of the ac­
cused. Therefore, most criminal law presumptions dealt with by 
the United States Supreme Court have sought justification because 
they served functions of rationality or convenience. 19 
B. 	 Historical Use of Presumptions in Criminal Cases 
Prior to 1911, the United States Supreme Court had not con­
sidered the problems of presumptions in any depth. When the mat­
ter was raised in a few state criminal cases, the Court dispensed 
with it quickly, holding that a state legislature had the right to de­
termine what evidence would be accepted in its courts. 20 
In 1911, in the case of Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City Rail­
road v. Turnipseed,21 a civil action for wrongful death, the Court 
first expressed the "rational relation" test. A Mississippi statute 
created a presumption of negligence on the part of a railroad when 
18. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
19. For an explanation of convenience and rationality, see text accompanying 
notes 16-17 supra. 
20. Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 599 (1904); Fong Yue Ting v. United 
States, 149 U.S. 698, 729 (1893). 
21. 	 219 U.S. 35 (1910). 
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an injury was inflicted due to the railroad's operation. 22 The rail­
road company contended that this statute violated the due process 
and the equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. The 
Court held that in order for a presumption to be constitutional 
there must be a "rational connection between the fact proved and 
the ultimate fact presumed. . . . "23 
Applying this standard, the Court upheld the presumption, 
stating that "It is not an unreasonable inference that a derailment 
of railway cars is due to some negligence, either in construction or 
maintenance of the track or trains, or some carelessness in opera­
tion. "24 Thus, rationality was established as a test for the validity of 
presumptions. Although Turnipseed was a civil case, the rational 
relation test would become important in analyzing the validity of 
presumptions in criminal cases. 
The Court, in other cases, developed two other tests, the 
"comparative convenience" test25 and the "greater-includes-the­
lesser" test. 26 The comparative convenience test required a pre­
sumption to be upheld if its function was to shift the burden of 
producing evidence to the defendant if he had more convenient ac­
cess to it. The greater-includes-the-Iesser test provided that the 
presumption must be constitutional if the statute establishing the 
crime was still constitutional when the element of the crime 
proved by the presumption was deleted from the definition of the 
statute. For example, in Ferry v. Ramsay,27 a Kansas statute made 
it unlawful for any bank director to assent to the receipt of deposits 
when he had knowledge that the bank was insolvent. The law fur­
ther provided that the fact of insolvency invoked a presumption of 
knowledge on the part of the director.28 Justice Holmes held that 
since it would have been within the legislature's power to impose 
22. In all actions against railroad companies for damages done to persons 
or property, proof of injury inflicted by the running of the locomotives or 
cars of such company shall be prima Jacie evidence of the want of reasona­
ble skill and care on the part of the servants of the company in reference to 
such injury. 
ld. at 41. 
23. ld. at 45. Although Turnipseed was a civil case, it continues to be cited as 
authority for the rational relation test in criminal cases. 
24. ld. at 44. 
25. Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82 (1934). 
26. Ferry v. Ramsey, 277 U.S. 88 (1928). 
27. ld. 
28. ld. at 93. 
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liability without knowledge, it was likewise permissible to take the 
lesser step of presuming knowledge. 29 
The rational relation test prevailed. In the case of Tot v. 
United States, 30 a criminal case, the Supreme Court expressly re­
jected the greater-includes-the-Iesser test. The Court was con­
cerned only with the constitutionality of the statute as written, not 
with hypothetical statutes which Congress for whatever reason had 
chosen not to enact. 31 The comparative convenience test was dis­
missed as a mere "corollary. "32 By "corollary" the Court apparently 
meant that, though convenience may be a goal served by a pre­
sumption, it alone cannot render a presumption constitutional. Tot 
established the Turnipseed rationality test33 as the controlling fac­
tor34 in determining the constitutionality of presumptions. 
Although the Court had recognized the significance of pre­
sumptions and appeared to have developed a specific test to deter­
mine their constitutionality, significant problems remained. One of 
these problems was the difficulty and arbitrariness involved in ap­
plying the rationality standard, as illustrated by the Court's hold­
ings in two 1965 cases, United States v. Gainey35 and United States 
v. Romano. 36 In these cases, the Court was faced with presump­
tions created by separate subsections of 26 U.S.C. § 5601. 37 Sub­
section b(2), at issue in Gainey, created a presumption that persons 
present at the site of an illegal still were guilty of carrying on an il­
legal distilling operation. The Court found this presumption to be 
rational and, therefore, constitutionally valid. 38 In Romano, subsec­
tion b(l) was at issue. This subsection created a presumption of il­
legal possession of a still from proof of the defendant's presence at 
the site. This presumption was found to be irrational and un­
constitutional. 39 In reaching contrary results in these two almost 
identical cases, the Court demonstrated that it was engaging in a 
kind of legal hairsplitting which could result only in confusion. 
Further complications developed with the Court's holding in 
29. [d. at 94-95. 
30. 319 U.S. 463 (1943). 
31. [d. at 472. 
32. [d. at 467. 
33. See text accompanying notes 21-23 supra. 
34. 319 U.S. at 467-68. 
35. 380 U.S. 63 (1965). 
36. 382 U.S. 136 (1965). 
37. 26 U.S.C. § 5601 h(I), (2) (1976). 
38. 380 U.S. at 68-71. 
39. 382 U.S. at 141. 
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In re Winship.4o This decision was not concerned with presump­
tions. It dealt with a New York statute which required proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence in a juvenile proceeding to estab­
lish delinquency. The New York Family Court Act41 defined a ju­
venile delinquent as a person between seven and sixteen years of 
age who does any act which, if done by an adult, would constitute 
a crime. Thus, in practical effect, the juvenile proceeding was a 
criminal trial. The Court unequivocally held that the Constitution 
requires a "beyond reasonable doubt" standard of proof as to every 
element of a crime. 42 
The holding of Winship may have impact on the law of pre­
sumptions. If a state is prohibited from a general lowering of the 
standard of proof in criminal cases, it should likewise be prohibited 
from lowering that standard as to a specific element of the crime 
charged. Commentators have theorized that if a criminal law pre­
sumption is to be constitutionally valid, the fact presumed must 
follow, beyond a reasonable doubt, from the fact proven. 43 In 
County Court of Ulster County v. Allen,44 the Court confronted 
this issue for the first time. 45 
III. COUNTY COURT OF ULSTER COUNTY 
V. ALLEN-THE OPINION 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to con­
sider the questions of whether it was proper for th~ United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to examine the facial con­
stitutionality of the statute, and whether the application of the pre­
sumption in this case was constitutional. 46 
The Court47 held that the Second Circuit had erred by consid­
40. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
41. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 712 (McKinney 1975). 
42. "Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the 
resonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects 
the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of ev­
ery fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." 397 U.S. at 364. 
43. Jeffries & Stephan, Defenses, Presumptions and Burden of Proof in Crimi­
nal Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1325, 1336 (1979). 
44. 442 U.S. 140 (1979). See text accompanying notes 1-11 supra. 
45. The Court alluded to this issue but declined to decide it in Barnes v. 
United States, 412 U.S. 837 (1973); Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970); and 
Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969). 
46. 442 U.S. at 147. For a procedural history, see text accompanying notes 3-6 
supra. 
47. Justice Stevens wrote the Court's opinion. Justice Powell, joined by Jus­
tices Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall, dissented. 
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ering the statute on its' face. 48 Facial attacks consider all possible 
applications of the statute including hypothetical situations. The 
Second Circuit had interpreted the rational relation test to mean 
that the presumed fact must flow more likely than not from the 
proven fact in common experience, without regard to any particu­
lars of the instant case. The Second Circuit had considered several 
hypothetical situations and concluded that it could not be said that 
presence in an automobile containing an illegal weapon meant, in 
more cases than not, that each person present had possession of 
the weapon. 49 
The Supreme Court explained that the federal courts are 
courts of limited jurisdiction and, therefore, have a duty to avoid 
deciding unnecessary questions. 50 Hence, with the limited excep­
tion for statutes broadly prohibiting speech protected by the first 
amendment, a party may not assert that a statute would be in vio­
lation of the rights of others in hypothetical situations. 51 The Court 
held that the Second Circuit's application of the more likely than 
not test was wrong and that the proper analysis should be whether, 
in light of all the circumstances of the case, it was rational for the 
jury to make the inference suggested by the statute. 52 
The Court then analyzed the facts in their entirety and found 
that since the two handguns were too large to fit completely into 
Ms. Doe's handbag, they may have been thrust there at the last 
minute, that such heavy weapons are unlikely to be possessed by a 
sixteen-year-old girl, and that it was more likely that she relied for 
protection on the knife found on her person. If, as was reasonable, 
the jury rejected the notion that the guns were in Ms. Doe's sole 
possession, then the Court said the case was tantamount to one 
where the guns were lying unconcealed in plain view of all the oc­
cupants. In such a case a jury would be rational in inferring posses­
sion of the guns by all occupants of the car. 53 
The Court rejected the argument that the standard for 
determining the constitutional validity of a presumption should be 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 54 Since this was a permissive presump­
tion, the jury was free to reject it if, on the basis of all the evi­
48. 442 U.S. at 163. 
49. 568 F.2d at 1006-07. 
50. 442 U.S. at 154-55. 
51. Jd. 
52. Jd. at 161-62. 
53. Id. at 164-65. 
54. Jd. at 166-67. 
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dence, it was not satisfied that guilt had been proven beyond a rea­
sonable doubt. The Court likened the presumption to a piece of 
relevant evidence which need not independently prove the case. 55 
It was crucial to the Court's determination of both the facial 
validity issue and the reasonable doubt issue that the presumption 
was permissive. Had the presumption been mandatory, the facial 
attack would have been permitted and the reasonable doubt 
standard required. 56 
The dissenting opinion disapproved of the different standards 
prescribed by the majority for facial attacks on permissive, as op­
posed to mandatory, presumptions. 57 The dissent observed that the 
jury instruction in this case authorized the jury to find possession 
on the basis of the presumption alone even if it rejected all other 
evidence bearing on the issue. 58 The jury may not have found it 
unlikely that the guns were in Ms. Doe's sole possession. Contrary 
to whether the majority believed it reasonable, the jury may not 
have found that the case was "tantamount to one in which the guns 
were lying on the floor or seat of the car in plain view of the three 
other occupants of the automobile. "59 In short, had the presump­
tion not been given, the jury may not have returned guilty ver­
dicts. For this reason, the dissent agrees with the Second Circuit 
that the presumption's rationality must be examined apart from any 
other factors in the case. 
Examining the presumption in this way, the dissent found that 
it is not "more likely than not" that an occupant of a car is in pos­
session of any illegal weapon found in that car. 60 The inference 
without more is plainly irrational. 61 Because the dissent arrived at 
this conclusion, it was unnecessary to consider the reasonable doubt 
standard. 62 
55. "There is no more reason to require a permissive statutory presumption to 
meet a reasonable doubt standard before it may be permitted to play any part in a 
trial than there is to require that degree of probative force for other relevant evi­
dence before it may be admitted." Id. 
56. [d. at 159-60, 167. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979). 
57. 442 U.S. at 176-77 (Powell, J., dissenting). Because the dissenters would 
have reversed based on a more likely than not standard, they found it unnecessary to 
consider the reasonable doubt issue. 
58. [d. at 175-76 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
59. [d. at 175 n.7 (quoting majority at 164). See text accompanying note 53 su­
pra. 
60. 442 U.S. at 174. 
61. [d. at 176. 
62. [d. at 169 n.2. 
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IV. CRITICISM 
After Winship63 established that the prosecution had the bur­
den of proving every element of a crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt, the appropriate standard for determining the constitutional 
validity of a presumption was called into question.' The crucial is­
sue is whether a presumption must be true beyond a reasonable 
doubt if an element of the crime is to be proven hy use of the pre­
sumption. To resolve this question, the Court established a distinc­
tion between mandatory and permissive presumptions. Henceforth, 
a mandatory presumption must meet the beyond reasonable doubt 
test. 64 A permissive presumption need only be true more likely 
than not. 65 
This distinction between permissive and mandatory presump­
tions is ill-founded. Although the dissent did not reach this issue, 
the conclusion that the more likely than not standard is insufficient 
flows logically from its analysis of the facial question. The dissent 
observed that the jury may have found possession based on no evi­
dence other than the presumption. If this were the case, the 
standard of proof required by Winship has not been met unless the 
presumption is true beyond a reasonable doubt. Contrary to the 
majority's characterization, a presumption is not just one more 
piece of evidence "on which the prosecution is entitled to rely as 
one not-necessarily-sufficient part of its proof. . . . "66 The jury is 
instructed that the presumption is sufficient to establish unlawful 
possession. 67 At a minimum, therefore, the Court should establish 
the beyond a reasonable doubt test as the standard for determining 
the constitutional validity of all criminal presumptions. 
V. PROPOSAL-ELIMINATE CRIMINAL LAw PRESUMPTIONS 
Even if the Court were to go so far as to say that all presump­
tions must meet the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, impor­
tant problems would remain. Central to our system of justice, and 
guaranteed by the Constitution, is the right to trial by jury.68 This 
guarantee must mean more than having a small group of people go 
through the formality of listening to a presentation before pronounc­
63. 397 U.S. at 358. 
64. 442 U.S. at 166-67. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. at 166. 
67. See note 9 supra. 
68. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 and amends. VI & XIV. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 
391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
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ing the accused guilty. In particular, it must mean that the jury 
should be left to wrestle with the diffiGult concepts involved in the 
words "beyond a reasonable doubt" before reaching a conclusion .. A 
judge could not instruct a jury "you may find the accused guilty, 
and we will let the appellate court decide whether there is proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt." The effect of a presumption may be to 
do exactly that as to a given element of the crime. Jury instructions 
are often long and complex. 69 Adrift in a sea of vague concepts 
69. In Alien, the instructions to the jury included the following: 
[Y]ou are the exclusive judge of all the questions of fact in this case. 
That means that you are the sole judges as to the weight to be given to the 
evidence and to the weight and probative value to be given to the testimony 
of each particular witness and to the credibility of any witness. 
Under our law, every defendant in a criminal trial starts the trial with 
the presumption in his favor that he is innocent, and this presumption fol­
lows him throughout the entire trial and remains with him until such time as 
you, by your verdict find him or her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt or in­
nocent of the charge. If you find him or her not guilty, then, of course, this 
presumption ripens into an established fact. On the other hand, if you find 
him or her guilty then this presumption has been overcome and is de­
stroyed. 
It is your duty to consider all the testimony in this case, to weigh it 
carefully and assess the credit to be given to a witness by his apparent in­
tention to speak the truth and by the accuracy of his memory to reconcile, if 
possible, conflicting statements as to material facts and in such ways to try 
and get at the truth and to reach a verdict upon the evidence. 
As so defined, possession means actual physical possession, just as hav­
ing the drugs or weapons in one's hand, in one's home or other place under 
one's exclusive control, or constructive possession which may exist without 
personal dominion over the drugs or weapons but with the intent and ability 
to retain such control or dominion. 
Our Penal Law also provides that the presence in an automobile of any 
machine gun or of any handgun or firearm which is loaded is presumptive 
evidence of their unlawful possession. 
In other words, these presumptions or this latter presumption upon 
proof of the presence of the machine gun and the hand weapons, you may 
infer and draw conclusions that such prohibitive weapon was possessed by 
each of the defendants who occupied the automobile at the time when such 
instruments were found. The presumption or presumptions is effective only 
so long as there is no substantial evidence contradicting the conclusion flow­
ing from the presumption, and the presumption is said to disappear when 
such contradictory evidence is adduced. 
To establish the unlawful possession of the weapons, again the People 
relied upon the presumption and, in addition thereto, the testimony of 
Anderson and Lemmons who testified in their case in chief. 
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such as possession and reasonable doubt, the New York statute 
gives the jury one compass upon which it may rely. It is told that 
the law equates presence with possession. It is far too likely that 
the jury will quickly grasp the presumption and, by clinging to it, 
avoid the task of grappling with the complexities of possession and 
reasonable doubt. Even if the presumption is then found by an ap­
pellate court to meet the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, the 
accused's right to a jury determination has been abridged. 
After the Court's opinion in Tot70 the only valid functions 
which a presumption constitutionally may serve are those of estab­
lishing a rational relation between basic and presumed facts, espe­
cially when the burden can be put on the party with more conven­
ient access. Although convenience by itself is not enough to justify 
a presumption, convenience may be asserted as one goal achieved 
by otherwise valid presumptions. 71 The argument for convenience 
is that if the defendant can more easily prove that the inference 
recommended by the presumption does not apply to him, the bur­
den should be upon him to do so. According to the convenience 
theory, then, if Hardrick, one of the Allen defendants who was in 
the back seat, did not have any dominion or control over the guns, 
at least he knew who did. He was in a better position than the 
Now, in order to find any of the defendants guilty of the unlawful pos­
session of the weapons, the machine gun, the .45 and the .38, you must be 
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants possessed the ma­
chine gun and the .45 and the .38, possessed it as I defined it to you before. 
Accordingly, you would be warranted in returning a verdict of guilt 
against the defendants or defendant if you find the defendants or defendant 
was in possession of a machine gun and the other weapons and that the fact 
of possession was proven to you by the People beyond a reasonable doubt, 
and an element of such proof is the reasonable presumption of illegal pos­
session of a machine gun or the presumption of illegal possession of fire­
arms, as I have just before explained to you. 
The presumption or presumptions which I discussed with the jury rela­
tive to the drugs or weapons in this case need not be rebutted by affirmative 
proof or affirmative evidence but may be rebutted by an evidence or lack of 
evidence in the case. 
442 U.S. at 160-62. 
70. 319 U.S. 463 (1943). See text accompanying notes 30-34 supra. 
71. Ashford & Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions and Due Process in Crimi­
nal Cases: A Theoretical Overoiew, 79 YALE L.J. 165, 180 (1969). See text accompa­
nying notes 15-19 supra. 
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prosecution to explain what the relationships of all the occupants 
were to the guns. 
The convenience theory, however, is in conflict not only with 
the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination but also with 
the common-law tradition establishing our system of justice as ac­
cusatory, not inquisitory.72 The prosecution must first prove guilt 
before the defendant can be asked to prove anything. Only when 
guilt has been proven under the statute should the burden fall 
upon the defendant to rebut the evidence. In analyzing the consti­
tutional posture of a criminal presumption, therefore, convenience 
is not an appropriate consideration. 
Even if the beyond a reasonable doubt standard is applied, 
this should not render a presumption valid. If the presumption is 
true beyond a reasonable doubt, it adds nothing to the trial by its 
inclusion. Without the presumption, the basic facts may be estab­
lished since the evidentiary test for relevancy is even less than 
more likely than not. For example, the federal rule merely re­
quires that the evidence have "any tendency to make the existence 
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action 
more probable or less probable ...."73 If the basic facts then give 
rise to a logical inference, the prosecutor remains free to point that 
out to the jury. If the inference advocated by the prosecutor is it­
self proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury will recognize that 
and will find the fact true beyond a reasonable doubt. If the infer­
ence is not so strong, but has some merit, the jury will attach to it 
the weight it deserves and will come to the proper conclusion. 
That is what a jury is for. 
The only factor added by a presumption is the jury instruc­
tion. The effect of a jury instruction may be to cloak with judicial 
respectability an inference which the jury may not have reached on 
its own. Even the Court in Allen recognized that a presumption 
must not undermine the fact finder's responsibility at trial to find 
the ultimate facts beyond a reasonable doubt on the basis of evi­
dence adduced by the state. 74 Since a presumption cannot enhance 
72. U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); 
United States v. Gooding, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 460, 471 (1827). 
73. FED. R. EVID. 401. 
74. 442 U.S. at 156. 
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a jury's ability to perform its responsibility, it can only be constitu­
tional if it has no effect at alPs 
In Allen, if the instruction on the presumption had not been 
given, the jury would have been able to consider such factors as 
the ages of the car's occupants, their positions in the car, and the 
size and location of the guns. The jury mayor may not have con­
cluded, based upon all these factors, that the defendants were 
guilty of unlawful possession beyond a reasonable doubt. The Su­
preme Court concluded that the presumption did not interfere 
with the jury's ability to make a proper analysis. Had the presump­
tion not been given, however, it could not have interfered with the 
jury's analysis. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The United States Supreme Court, in County Court of Ulster 
County v. Allen,76 upheld the convictions of three men for illegal 
possession of handguns. The men and a sixteen-year-old girl were 
occupants of a car which police stopped on the New York State 
Thruway. Two guns were found in the girl's pocketbook. A statu­
tory presumption of possession from proof of presence in the auto­
mobile was used to convict the three men. The constitutionality of 
the presumption was the issue presented to the Court. 
In upholding this presumption, the Supreme Court adopted 
two standards to analyze the constitutional validity of criminal pre­
sumptions. A mandatory presumption must be true beyond a rea­
sonable doubt. A permissive presumption need only be true more 
likely than not. Such a distinction is unjustified since even a per­
missive presumption may be relied on by the jury to establish 
guilt. 
Even the· beyond a reasonable doubt standard should not 
render presumptions constitutional in criminal cases. Presumptions 
are an intrusion upon the jury's responsibility to determine guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Allowing an appellate court to test 
whether a presumption is true beyond a reasonable doubt should 
not be a constitutionally permissible substitute for a trial by jury. 
Steven A. Bolton 
75. For an attempt to quantify the magnitude of the possible harmful effects of 
presumptions, see Ashford & Risinger, supra note 71. 
76. 442 U.S. at 140. 
